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The run-up to the recent global ￿nancial crisis was characterised by an environment of low interest
rates and a rapid increase in housing market activity across OECD countries. The link between
the two is intuitive: low interest rates make credit cheaper and increase the demand for housing.
Some scholars argue that expansionary monetary policy was responsible for the low level of interest
rates and the subsequent house price boom ￿ for example, Hume and Sentance (2009) and Taylor
(2009). Others contend that the low degree of ￿nancial development in emerging market economies
led to capital in￿ ows to developed countries, depressing long term interest rates and stimulating an
increase in the demand for housing ￿ for example, Caballero et al. (2008), Warnock and Warnock
(2009) and Bernanke (2010). Figure 1 provides support for this hypothesis, showing that in the
period from 1999 to 2006 house prices rose by more in countries with larger current account de￿cits.
This negative correlation suggests the presence of an important link between the current account
balance and the housing sector, but the direction of causality is unclear.
One other factor which is thought to have played a role in amplifying the e⁄ect of interest
rate movements on housing activity is ￿nancial innovation. In more developed mortgage markets,
consumers have easier access to credit and tend to be more leveraged. In the presence of ￿nancial
frictions, the impact of changes in interest rates on consumer wealth and the housing market
should become stronger when leverage is higher. This is the idea behind the ￿nancial accelerator
e⁄ect developed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In addition to
this e⁄ect, there may also be ampli￿cation through securitization. Diamond and Rajan (2009)
argue that excessive securitization has led to a misallocation of capital to the real estate sector,
exacerbating the e⁄ect of interest rate movements on housing activity.
Each of these explanations has di⁄erent policy implications. Should policy makers try to address
external imbalances, increase ￿nancial regulation or redesign the monetary policy framework to
prevent future boom and bust episodes in the housing market?
In this study we estimate a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model for a panel of 18 OECD countries
and look at the e⁄ects of capital in￿ ows, monetary policy and ￿nancial innovation on the housing
sector. Monetary policy and capital in￿ ows shocks are identi￿ed using the sign restrictions approach
developed by Canova and de Nicol￿ (2002) and Uhlig (2005). We look at the e⁄ect of both types
of shocks on real credit to the private sector, real residential investment, and real house prices. We
also assess whether the degree of mortgage market development or legislation permitting issuance
of mortgage-backed securities amplify or dampen the impact of these shocks on the housing sector.
Previous work using VAR models to analyse the housing market has focused on the transmis-
sion of monetary policy shocks in advanced economies ￿ for example, Assenmacher-Wesche and
Gerlach (2010), Carstensen et al. (2009), Calza et al. (2009) and Goodhart and Ho⁄mann (2008).
At the same time, there is a substantial literature looking at the "capital in￿ ows problem" and
its implication for asset prices in developing economies ￿ for example, Calvo et al. (1994) ￿
but studies examining this link for advanced economies are still scarce. For example, Reinhart
and Reinhart (2008) ￿nd that large capital in￿ ows in both advanced and emerging economies are
2associated with a real exchange rate appreciation and booms in equity and house prices. Similarly,
Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009) document a negative relationship between current account balances
and real house price growth in a broad sample of developed and developing countries, like the one
displayed in Figure 1 for OECD countries.
Our paper brings together these two strands of literature, looking at the e⁄ect of both capital
in￿ ows and monetary policy shocks. In this respect, it is closest to SÆ and Wieladek (2010), who
estimate an open-economy VAR model for the United States and use sign restrictions derived from
a 2-country DSGE model to identify the e⁄ect of both shocks on the housing market. They ￿nd
that capital in￿ ows shocks explain a substantial amount of the variation in real house prices and
residential investment in the United States. While SÆ and Wieladek (2010) only focus on the United
States, we look at a broader sample of all OECD countries.
Another contribution of this paper is to study the role of ￿nancial innovation in the transmission
of monetary policy and capital in￿ ows shocks to the housing sector. We ￿rst separate our sample
into a group of countries with high mortgage market development and a group of countries with
low mortgage market development. Countries are classi￿ed using an index constructed in IMF
(2008), which takes a higher value if typical loan-to-value ratios are high, there is the possibility
of mortgage equity withdrawal (i.e. consumers can borrow against the value of their houses to
￿nance spending), secondary mortgage markets exist, and mortgage contracts are predominantly
long term. We estimate our panel VAR model separately for these two groups of countries and
compare their impulse responses following monetary policy and capital in￿ ows shocks.
To study how securitization a⁄ects the transmission of capital in￿ ows and monetary policy
shocks to the housing market we use a de jure index constructed by Ho⁄man and Nitschka (2009)
which captures the extent to which securitization is allowed in di⁄erent countries. The index
varies both across countries and across time. Splitting the sample into groups would neglect the
time variation. To exploit the time variation in this index, we estimate an interacted panel VAR
model, as in Towbin and Weber (2010). By interacting all variables with an index of mortgage-
backed securitization, we allow the responses to vary with the degree of securitization. We then
compare impulse responses evaluated at high and low levels of securitization.
Some previous studies have looked at whether the structure of the mortgage market plays a role
in the propagation of monetary policy shocks. Calza et al. (2009) and Assenmacher-Wesche and
Gerlach (2010) ￿nd that higher mortgage market development ampli￿es the e⁄ects of monetary
policy shocks on housing variables. Both studies estimate panel VAR models across two groups of
countries, classi￿ed according to their degree of mortgage market development using various cross-
sectional indicators. Our approach is similar to theirs, but di⁄ers in three important ways. First, we
identify the e⁄ect of capital in￿ ows shocks in addition to monetary policy shocks. Second, we use
sign restrictions rather than zero restrictions for identi￿cation of the shocks.1 Third, we estimate
an interacted panel VAR which allows us to study the e⁄ects of time-varying characteristics of the
1See Canova and de Nicol￿ (2002) or Uhlig (2005) for a critique of the use of zero restrictions to identify monetary
policy shocks.
3mortgage market without having to split the sample in sub-groups.
Our results suggest that both monetary policy and capital in￿ ows shocks have a signi￿cant and
positive e⁄ect on house prices, credit to the private sector and residential investment. A reduction
of 10 basis points on long term nominal interest rates caused by an expansionary monetary policy
shock raises real credit and house prices by about 0:3% after ten quarters and real residential
investment by about 0:2%. A similar reduction in long rates caused by a capital in￿ ows shock has
a larger e⁄ect, with the rise in real credit to the private sector and real house prices reaching a peak
of about 0:5% after seven quarters. The response of real residential investment to capital in￿ ows
shocks is quicker and more short-lived, peaking at 0:7% after two quarters.
The e⁄ects of both shocks are greater in countries with a higher degree of mortgage market
development. This suggests that excessive ￿nancial innovation may act as a propagation mecha-
nism. The existence of mortgage-backed securities has a much larger e⁄ect on the transmission of
capital in￿ ows shocks. Legislation permitting the issuance of mortgage-backed securities increases
the impact of capital in￿ ows shocks on real house prices, real residential investment and real credit
to the private sector by a factor of two. This may be explained by the fact that securitization trans-
forms illiquid, low-grade loans into publicly traded assets of higher quality which are attractive to
foreign investors. In this way, securitization increases the share of foreign capital in￿ ows allocated
to home mortgage loans, amplifying the e⁄ect of capital in￿ ows on the domestic housing market.
Our results suggest that persistent capital in￿ ows, coupled with securitization, played a signi￿cant
role in the housing booms observed in some countries in the run-up to the ￿nancial crisis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 looks at the literature on the transmission channels of
interest rates to housing activity and discusses how ￿nancial innovation may amplify those channels.
Section 3 discusses the methodology and data. The main results are presented in section 4 and
various robustness checks in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Transmission Channels of Interest Rates to Housing Mar-
kets
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Mishkin (2007) survey the literature on potential transmission
channels between interest rates and the real economy. While their focus is on interest rate changes
caused by monetary policy, the same channels would be in place for interest rate changes caused
by capital in￿ ows. In a neoclassical world the user cost of capital is the only transmission channel:
lower interest rates on bonds decrease the opportunity cost of buying a house and increase the
demand for houses. In the presence of information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders
or other types of ￿nancial frictions, there is an additional transmission channel ￿ the ￿nancial
accelerator e⁄ect, developed in the seminal papers of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997).
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) focus on the investment decision of ￿rms. There is asymmetric
information between lenders and entrepreneurs: while entrepreneurs know the pro￿tability of their
4investment projects, lenders must pay an auditing cost to observe the project￿ s return. This infor-
mation asymmetry is the key source of persistence in the model. A negative real interest rate shock
increases the pro￿ts of entrepreneurs and lowers agency costs, making it easier for them to obtain
external ￿nance. As a result, more investment projects are ￿nanced, which creates employment for
young agents and leads to further income expansion in subsequent periods.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) add an additional element to this story: the idea that the net
worth of borrowers changes not only in response to variations in cash ￿ ows, but also to changes
in the value of their assets. In their framework agents can only borrow against collateral (for
example, land) and the amount they can borrow depends on the value of collateral. The need
for collateral in this model arises not because of asymmetric information but because of limited
commitment, i.e. lenders cannot force borrowers to work in order to repay their debt. The dynamic
interaction between the borrowing constraint and the value of collateral generates both persistence
and ampli￿cation. A temporary increase in interest rates reduces borrowers￿net worth and tightens
their credit constraint. Borrowers cut back on their investment expenditure (including investment
in land) and their net worth next period falls as they earn less revenue. This is analogous to
the persistence e⁄ect in Bernanke and Gertler. But there is an additional e⁄ect that operates
through the price of land. To ensure market clearing, demand for land by lenders has to rise, which
requires a reduction in the user cost of land (the di⁄erence between that period￿ s land price and
the discounted value of the land price in the following period). The anticipated decline in user
costs in subsequent periods leads to an even larger fall in the price of land in the current period,
since the price of land equals the discounted value of future user costs. The fall in the price of land
reduces net worth of borrowers in the current period even further and has a large impact on their
investment spending since they are highly leveraged. There is an ampli￿cation e⁄ect that occurs
because the price of land is forward looking and borrowers are highly leveraged.
The empirical relevance of the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect has been studied, for example, in
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). This study presents a dynamic general equilibrium model
that incorporates both the persistence e⁄ect in the original Bernanke and Gertler (1989) model and
endogenous changes in asset price which generate further ampli￿cation, as in Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). A number of studies ￿ for example, Iacoviello (2005) and Calza et. al (2009) ￿ apply the
￿nancial accelerator to the housing market, where a similar mechanism is at work. A reduction
in interest rates increases the value of collateral (housing) by increasing the discounted value of
future user costs. The borrowers￿debt capacity and consequently the demand for housing increases
further, generating an even larger increase in house prices. Persistence and ampli￿cation would
be mutually reinforcing and propagate the e⁄ect of the initial shock to interest rates on housing
activity.
These studies predict that the transmission channels would be stronger in countries with more
developed mortgage markets. Higher loan-to-value ratios reinforce the ampli￿cation e⁄ect described
in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) as households are more leveraged and their net worth is more a⁄ected
by ￿ uctuations in the value of collateral. The possibility of mortgage equity withdrawal (i.e., the
5possibility to borrow against the value of the house to ￿nance spending) should have a similar
e⁄ect. Countries where it is less costly to re￿nance mortgages should also see stronger transmission
from interest rates to housing activity, since interest rate reductions would feed through to lower
mortgage rates not only for new mortgages but also for existing ones. This would lower the cost of
credit and increase housing demand.
There is yet an additional channel through which interest rates may a⁄ect house prices: the risk
taking channel, proposed by Rajan (2005) and Borio and Zhu (2008). According to this theory, low
interest rates encourage ￿nancial intermediaries to take more risk, for example because they target
a certain rate of return and need to take more risk to achieve that target when risk-free interest
rates are lower (a search for yield e⁄ect). This would lead to an increase in demand for riskier
assets, driving up their prices. The underpricing of risk may also lead to more lenient lending
standards, for example higher loan-to-value ratios or lending to households with higher default
risk. This would increase borrowers￿leverage and strengthen the ampli￿cation e⁄ect of changes in
collateral values described above. Hence, there may be an interesting interaction between the risk
taking channel and the ￿nancial accelerator.
Diamond and Rajan (2009) argue that securitization also plays an important role in the trans-
mission of interest rate shocks to the housing market. Securitization allows banks to share risks
by moving them o⁄ their balance sheets. This leads to an increase in banks￿risk appetite and
strengthens the risk taking channel described above. To the extent that banks become more le-
nient in their lending standards, the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect may be strengthened as well. By
amplifying these transmission channels, securitization may play a role in propagating the e⁄ects of
interest rate reductions on housing activity. Diamond and Rajan also highlight that securitization
facilitates foreign investment in mortgage loans. Without securitization, it is di¢ cult for foreign
investors to hold home mortgage loans directly, because they are of uncertain credit quality and
have a higher propensity to default than other assets. Securitization packages mortgages together
and slices them in di⁄erent levels of risk. The riskiest tranches can be bought by investors with
higher risk appetite, while the AAA tranches can be sold to international investors. In this way,
securitization increases the share of foreign capital in￿ ows allocated to home mortgage loans. This
would suggest that securitization may have a particularly strong role in the transmission of capital
in￿ ows shocks to the housing market, a conjecture which is supported by our empirical results.
3 Methodology
3.1 Data
We estimate an open economy VAR model for a panel of eighteen OECD countries.2 The model
includes twelve variables: the consumer price index, real consumption, real non-residential invest-
ment, short-term interest rates, long-term interest rates, the ratio of the current account balance
2The sample includes Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
6to GDP, the trade-weighted real exchange rate, world GDP, world prices, real house prices, real
credit to the private sector, and real residential investment. World variables are constructed using
country-speci￿c trade weights to account for di⁄erent geographic exposures. They are included to
control for the state of the global economy.
The ￿rst nine variables are included to help with identi￿cation. The last three variables capture
developments in the housing market. While mortgage credit would be preferable to total private
credit, it is not available for the whole sample of countries.
The model includes both short-term and long-term interest rates. For the countries in our
sample, short-term interest rates are largely controlled by central banks. Movements in nominal
short-term interest rates are commonly used in VARs to identify monetary policy shocks. Long-
term interest rates, on the other hand, tend to be driven by ￿nancial market outcomes. As a
result, one would expect to observe the e⁄ect of capital in￿ ows shocks on long-term rather than on
short-term interest rates.
We follow a large literature in monetary economics ￿ see, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (1999) ￿ and include all variables in levels. Apart from interest rates, all variables are
in logs.3
The data sources are the OECD Economic Outlook, the IMF International Financial Statistics
(IFS), and the BIS Macro database. Trade-weighted world variables are constructed using the
data in Pesaran, Schuermann and Smith (2009) and trade data from the IMF Direction of Trade
Statistics. The variables and data sources are listed in Table 1. The model is estimated with
two lags4 using quarterly data over the period of the Great Moderation from 1984Q1 to 2006Q4.
The high in￿ ation period from the late 1970s to the early 1980s and the recent ￿nancial crisis are
therefore excluded.
3.2 Empirical Model
The model has the following reduced form representation:
Yi;t = Ci +
L X
k=1
Ai;kYi;t￿k + uit t = 1;:::T i = 1;:::;N ui;t ￿ N(0;￿it) (1)
where Yi;t is a q ￿ 1 vector of explanatory variables, Ci is a q ￿ 1 vector of country-speci￿c
intercepts, Ai;k is a q￿q matrix of autoregressive coe¢ cients up to lag L, and uit is the q￿1 vector
of one-step-ahead prediction errors, normally distributed with a q ￿q covariance matrix ￿. Indices
i and t indicate that the coe¢ cients are allowed to vary across countries and time.
3Canova (2005) suggests that, if there is uncertainty on whether the variables in the VAR are stationary, the best
solution is to include potentially non-stationary variables in levels. Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) show that in the
presence of non-stationarity OLS estimates are super-consistent. Sims (1988) shows that Bayesian inference with a
standard Normal-Wishart prior is not a⁄ected by non-stationarity.
4Hannan Quinn and Schwarz Information Criteria suggest a lag length between one and two for individual coun-
tries. We follow Calza et al. (2009) and choose a lag length of two. We obtain similar results when using one or three
lags instead.
7It is useful to write the model in recursive form:
Ji;tYi;t = ~ Ci +
L X
k=1
~ Ai;kYi;t￿k + ~ uit t = 1;:::T i = 1;:::;N ~ ui;t ￿ N(0; ~ ￿); (2)
where Ji is a lower triangular q ￿ q matrix with ones on the main diagonal, ~ Ci = JiCi;; ~ Ait;k =
Ji;tAit;k for k = 1;:::;L; ~ ui = Jiui; and ~ ￿ = Ji;t￿itJ0
i;t is a diagonal matrix. By estimating the
model in recursive form, we allow for variation in contemporaneous correlation of variables across
countries.
3.2.1 Baseline Model
Using a panel rather than a single country framework increases the number of observations and leads
to more precise estimates. However, transmission mechanisms are likely to vary across countries,
for example due to di⁄erences in institutional arrangements. We assume that both the intercept
and slope coe¢ cients can vary across countries: ~ Ci = ￿ C + "i;0, ~ Ai;k = ￿ Ak + "i;k, where ￿ C and ￿ Ak
are the cross-sectional averages and "i;0 and "i;k capture country-speci￿c variation.
Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that the standard ￿xed e⁄ects estimator, which only allows
for heterogeneous intercepts but imposes homogeneous slopes, is inconsistent in dynamic panels if
there is also slope heterogeneity. Applying the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator leads to serial correlation in
the residuals. A combination of serially correlated residuals and regressors will therefore lead to
biased estimates. Pesaran and Smith (1995) propose the mean group estimator as a solution to this
problem. We implement this estimator by interacting all variables with country dummies Di;k for
i = 1;:::;N. This procedure amounts to a generalized version of the standard ￿xed e⁄ects estimator
that adds ￿xed e⁄ects on the slope coe¢ cients in addition to ￿xed e⁄ects on the intercepts. The
interacted country dummies capture all country-speci￿c time-invariant variation "i;k = Di;k . We
begin our empirical analysis by looking at the impulse responses implied by the estimated average
coe¢ cients, which can be interpreted as the responses of a typical OECD country.
3.2.2 Cross-sectional Heterogeneity in Mortgage Market Structure
As a next step we investigate the e⁄ect of the mortgage market structure on the transmission
of shocks. As documented in IMF (2008) there is substantial heterogeneity in mortgage market
development across countries. While in Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries deregulation of mortgage
markets was relatively rapid and was completed by the mid-1980s, in Japan and continental Europe
the process was more gradual.
In more developed mortgage markets consumers should have easier access to credit because
of stronger competition and a greater variety of funding sources and loan products. We use the
index constructed in IMF (2008) as a summary measure for a number of variables that characterize
mortgage market development. The index takes a high value if typical loan-to-value ratios are
high, there is the possibility of mortgage equity withdrawal (i.e. consumers can borrow against the
8value of their houses to ￿nance spending), households are able to re￿nance their mortgages without
paying fees, secondary mortgage markets exist, and mortgage contracts are predominantly long-
term. Because of limited data availability the index is time-invariant and refers to the mid-2000s.
In the next section we adapt the model to look at the e⁄ect of a time-varying measure of mortgage
market structure.
We use this index to split countries into two groups: one group with highly developed mortgage
markets (HDM) and another with less developed mortgage markets (LDM).5 Figure 2 shows that
the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries tend to have a highly developed mortgage market, whereas
most countries in continental Europe are in the less developed group.6 In the baseline analysis we
work with the overall index. To assess the robustness of the results, we then look at some of its
subcomponents, splitting countries according to the typical loan-to-value ratio and the possibility of
mortgage equity withdrawal. As an alternative to the IMF index, we also split countries using the
ratio of mortgage debt to GDP in 2004 taken from the tables in Calza et al (2009). The resulting
country groups are listed in Table 2.
Some of the indicators used to construct the mortgage market index, for example loan-to-
value ratios, tend to vary over the business cycle and are likely to respond to economic shocks.
This could be a problem for our approach, since we assume that mortgage market characteristics
are structural factors and are invariant to the business cycle. Note, however, that our results
use only cross-sectional variation, not time-series variation, and are therefore not subject to this
critique. Other indicators, such as the possibility of mortgage equity withdrawal, are slow-moving
institutional variables and are not likely to be a⁄ected by business cycle ￿ uctuations.
The e⁄ect of time-invariant features of the mortgage market on the dynamics is fully captured
by the country-speci￿c variation "i;k in the VAR coe¢ cients. Let "i;k = mori;k + ￿i;k where mori;k
stands for the e⁄ects of country speci￿c variation in the mortgage market and ￿i;k for other dif-
ferences unrelated to the mortgage market. Because ￿i;k has mean zero by assumption, the e⁄ects
of mortgage market development can then be estimated by computing the average coe¢ cient for




and morLDM;k; = 1
NLDM
P
i2LDM "i;k: We can interpret the impulse responses implied by the VAR
coe¢ cient matrices ~ Ai;kHDM;k = ￿ Ak + morHDM;k and ~ Ai;kLDM;k = ￿ Ak + morLDM;k for k = 1;:::;L
as the responses in a typical country with a more developed market and in a typical country with
a less developed market.
5For Switzerland we use the value calculated by Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2010). Because the index is
not available for New Zealand, this country is excluded from the sample.
6We split the sample at the median value. Attributing Finland (the country with the median value) to the highly
developed group or excluding it from the sample does not a⁄ect our results. Our results are also qualitatively robust
if several high mortgage market development countries close to the median value of the index are attributed to the
low mortgage market development group and vice versa.
93.2.3 Securitization and Time-varying Financial Structure
A major development in mortgage ￿nance in the past twenty ￿ve years has been the increased
availability of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) through changes in legislation in a number of
countries. Ho⁄mann and Nitschka (2009) construct a qualitative de jure indicator for the degree
securitization in the mortgage sector.7 To exploit this variation we follow the approach of Towbin
and Weber (2010) and augment the VAR with an interaction term. To estimate the e⁄ect of
securitization on the transmission mechanism we interact all variables with the securitization index
and generalize our model to:
JitYi;t = ~ Cit +
L X
k=1
~ Ait;kYi;t￿k + ~ uit t = 1;:::T i = 1;:::;N ~ uit~N(0; ~ ￿)
where ~ Ait;k = D0
ik+D1
kMBSi;t+"i;k; and MBSi;t stands for the securitization index. Equivalent
de￿nitions hold for the lower triangular matrix Jit and the intercept ~ Cit. The e⁄ect of securitization
on the regression coe¢ cients (D1
k) is assumed to be homogenous across countries, while D0
ik is
country speci￿c.
We can compute impulse responses for a typical country with a high degree of securitization
and coe¢ cient matrix ~ AHMBS;k = D0
ik +D1
kMBSHIGH and a typical country with a low degree of
securitization and coe¢ cient matrix ALMBS;k = D0
ik + D1
kMBSLOW. Apart from its e⁄ect on the
dynamics, securitization may also have a permanent e⁄ect on the level of variables. To control for
such an e⁄ect, we also include the index in levels.
The securitization index equals one if countries have a fully liberalized MBS market and zero
if no securitization is allowed. If a limited degree of securitization is allowed the index takes the
value 0:3. The data is at quarterly frequency and covers the period from 1985Q1 to 2008Q1. In the
United States mortgage-backed securities have been allowed during the whole sample period. In
Australia, Canada, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom they have become widely
available after major mortgage market reforms during the sample period. Whereas a limited form
of securitization has existed in Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden for a long time, liberalization has
led to an intermediate degree of securitization in Finland, France, and New Zealand. In Denmark,
Italy, Japan, Belgium, and Norway securitization has not been introduced.8 If securitization a⁄ects
the transmission of monetary policy shocks and capital in￿ ows shocks, we expect to see variation
in the VAR coe¢ cients over time.
7We would expect the degree of securitization to be endogenous to developments in the housing market. When the
housing market is booming the probability of mortgage default is low and there is high demand for MBS. When real
house prices decline, on the other hand, borrowers￿default probabilities increase and become correlated and MBS
lose liquidity as a result. Because the indicator constructed by Ho⁄man and Nitschka is a de jure indicator, it re￿ ects
insitutional changes in the ability to securitize assets and is not likely to su⁄er from endogeneity.
8The dataset constructed in Ho⁄mann and Nitschka (2009) has no information for New Zealand and Ireland. Based
on our own research, we constructed additional time series on the degree of securitization in these two countries. New
Zealand has allowed a a limited degree of securitization in 1996 (Brady (1998)). The index takes a value of 0 until
1995Q4 and a value of 0.3 afterwards. For Ireland, the index is zero until 1995Q4 and takes the value one therafter
(Addison-Smyth et al (2009)).
103.3 Identi￿cation
We identify two types of shocks that lead to lower domestic interest rates: an expansionary monetary
policy shock and a capital in￿ ows shock. The two shocks are identi￿ed using the sign restrictions
approach developed by Canova and de Nicol￿ (2002), Faust and Rogers (2003), and Uhlig (2005).
We can think of the one step ahead prediction error ut as a linear combination of orthonormal
structural shocks ut = Bvt, with E(v0
tvt) = I. The only restriction on B comes from the covariance
matrix of the prediction errors ￿ = E(utu0
t) = E(Bvtv0
tB0) = BB0: This leaves many degrees
of freedom in specifying B and further restrictions are necessary to achieve identi￿cation. The
challenge for structural VAR models is to ￿nd credible restrictions on B. Sign restrictions narrow
down the set of acceptable B by restricting the sign of the impulse responses of a set of variables
to a structural shock.
Table 3 lists the sign restrictions used to identify capital in￿ ows and monetary policy shocks.
They are similar to the ones in SÆ and Wieladek (2010) and rely on previous theoretical and
empirical work. We do not impose any restrictions on the housing variables, which are our main
variables of interest. Following Uhlig (2005), the restrictions are imposed for four quarters after
the shock.
Positive capital in￿ ows shocks lead to an increase in the current account de￿cit, a decrease in the
long term interest rate, an appreciation of the real exchange rate, and an increase in consumption
and non-residential investment. The restrictions are consistent with the regularities of capital in￿ ow
periods identi￿ed in Reinhart and Reinhart (2008). We understand a capital in￿ ows shock to be
an unexpected increase in foreigners￿demand for domestic assets.
Open economy models deliver a number of reasons why foreigners may increase their demand
for domestic assets. For example, a global increase in savings would increase demand for assets in
general and therefore also lower the domestic ex ante real interest rate. Domestic residents dissave
and consume more, while investment rises, leading to a real exchange rate appreciation and a current
account de￿cit. Another possibility is a reshu› ing of foreigners￿portfolios towards domestic assets
as in SÆ and Viani (2010) and Caballero et al. (2008). Such a shift may happen because of
changes in the portfolio preferences of foreign investors, foreign ￿nancial market structure or a
domestic ￿nancial reform, all of which make it more attractive for foreigners to invest in domestic
assets. Again, the portfolio shift towards domestic assets leads to a capital in￿ ow that ￿nances
consumption and investment, lowers real domestic interest rates and appreciates the domestic
currency. Finally, foreign monetary authorities may attempt to improve competitiveness through
expansionary monetary policy. Low foreign interest rates make domestic assets more attractive,
capital in￿ ows drive down the domestic real interest rate, and the real exchange rate appreciates.
Although the sources of these events are quite distinct, we argue that the consequences for
the domestic economy and in particular the housing sector should be similar. In all cases, lower
domestic real interest rates should lead to an expansion in domestic credit and spur housing activity.
We restrict the real long term interest rate rather than the nominal rate because real shifts in
the total demand for domestic assets should a⁄ect real returns. The restriction is on the long rate
11as opposed to the short rate because a broad class of models assumes that the central bank perfectly
controls the short rate. In order to compute the ex ante real long term interest rate we need to
subtract expected in￿ ation from the nominal rate. Our measure for expected in￿ ation is the VAR
forecast. We implement the sign restriction on the real long rate by computing the response of the
nominal long rate and the price level in a ￿rst step. We then use the response of the price level
to compute the response of the (annualized) ten year in￿ ation and subtract the in￿ ation response
from the response of the nominal long term rate to compute the response of the ex ante real rate.9
Our assumption regarding the behavior of the long term interest rate is crucial to distinguish
capital in￿ ows shocks from other shocks that generate a real appreciation and a current account
de￿cit. Consider a small open economy with nontraded goods and imperfect substitutability be-
tween domestic and foreign assets. An aggregate demand shock (public or private) would lead to a
real appreciation (because of higher demand for nontraded goods) and a current account de￿cit, but
to an increase in the real interest rate. Without the restriction on the long rate, the shock could be
observationally equivalent to a capital in￿ ows shock. In standard models, transitory productivity
shocks generate a current account surplus because people save a large fraction of their temporary
income increase. The current account behavior is inconsistent with our sign restrictions for capital
in￿ ows shocks. However, a permanent increase in the total factor productivity will lead to a cur-
rent account de￿cit. The shock increases the marginal productivity of capital, making investment
in the domestic economy more attractive. Since the increase is permanent and the consumption
smoothing motive disappears, savings will not rise. Therefore, there is a net capital in￿ ow into
the domestic economy and the exchange rate appreciates, just as with capital in￿ ows shocks. A
permanent increase in productivity leads, however, to an increase in the domestic real interest
rate because the marginal productivity of capital increases and imperfect substitutability between
assets impedes exact interest rate parity. Hence, the sign restriction on the long rate allows us to
distinguish a permanent productivity shock from a capital in￿ ows shock.10
Our identi￿cation restrictions for monetary policy shocks rely on a large literature surveyed in
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999). An expansionary monetary policy shock decreases the
nominal short term interest rate, leads to an increase in prices, consumption and non residential
investment and to a real depreciation. This is consistent with the sign restrictions derived the-
oretically in Canova and de Nicol￿ (2002). They show that, under a variety of di⁄erent models,
output and prices rise following an expansionary monetary policy shock. The restriction on the
exchange rate follows from a simple Mundell Fleming model: lower interest rates decrease the de-
mand for domestic ￿nancial assets and lead to a depreciation of the nominal and (in a sticky price
environment) the real exchange rate. This restriction follows from uncovered interest rate parity,
for which empirical support is limited. It should be noted, however, that the restriction is only on
9Restricting the response of the real or nominal short term interest rate yields very similar results.
10It is theoretically possible that the central bank cuts the nominal rate aggressively to ￿ght the de￿ ationary
pressures that arise from the increase in productivity. This can also lead to a fall in the real rate, at least at
shorter horizons. In that case, however, a permanent productivity shock will still have a permanent e⁄ect on the real
exchange rate. Our empirical results indicate no permanent e⁄ect on the real exchange rate, which is inconsistent
with a permanent productivity shock.
12the sign and not the exact magnitude of the exchange rate movement. There is broad empirical
support that the exchange rate depreciates after an expansionary monetary policy shock ￿ see, for
example, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Forni and Gambetti (2010), Scholl and Uhlig (2008) and
Zettelmeyer (2004).11
A common alternative to sign restrictions is the Choleski decomposition, which assumes a lower
triangular structure for B. This corresponds to imposing zero restrictions on the contemporane-
ous interactions between variables. To identify a monetary policy shock the set of explanatory
variables must be split into two groups: a group of variables that do not respond contemporane-
ously to the short term interest rate but to which the short rate reacts; and a group of variables
that react contemporaneously to changes in the short rate but have no immediate e⁄ect on the
short rate. A number of studies use the Choleski decomposition to analyze the e⁄ect of monetary
policy shocks on the housing sector ￿ for example, Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2010) and
Calza, Monacelli, and Straca (2009). A Choleski decomposition often forces researchers to impose
more zero restrictions on contemporaneous relations than delivered by theory. The ordering of
asset prices and credit with respect to the short term interest rate is especially problematic. Sign
restrictions provide a means to check the robustness of these studies by using less restrictive identi-
￿cation assumptions. In order to allow for a potential zero response of consumption, non-residential
investment and prices, we impose the sign restrictions only after the ￿rst quarter.
3.4 Inference
Following Uhlig (2005) we compute Bayesian error bands. Our error bands capture two types of
uncertainty: parameter uncertainty and identi￿cation uncertainty. Uncertainty about the true pa-
rameters Ai;k and ￿ follows from a limited number of observations and appears in all SVAR models.
For SVARs that use exact short or long run restrictions there is no identi￿cation uncertainty: given
￿ and Ai;k , there is a unique B that satis￿es the identi￿cation restrictions. With sign restrictions
there is a set of B matrices that satisfy the sign restrictions. Identi￿cation is inexact and there
is additional uncertainty about the correct identi￿cation scheme. Using an approach similar to
Paustian (2007) we separate identi￿cation and parameter uncertainty.
To account for parameter uncertainty we use an uninformative Normal-Wishart prior. We draw
all parameters jointly from the posterior (including the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms). We
start from the recursive model (2). Since the covariance matrix ~ ￿ is diagonal by construction, we can
proceed equation by equation. Given a parameter draw d, we then evaluate the coe¢ cient for the
country type we are interested in. For example, for a country with high prevalence of mortgage-
backed securities we compute ~ Ad
HMBS;k = D0d
ik + D1d
k MBSHIGH, given draws D0d
ik and D1d
k : As
in Cogley and Sargent (2005) we impose the prior that responses are not explosive and discard
11An unresolved issue is whether "delayed overshooting" occurs. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Scholl and Uhlig
(2008) ￿nd that the exchange rate continues to depreciate for a few periods after the monetary policy shock, which
is in contradiction to Dornbusch￿ s (1976) overshooting model. Forni and Gambetti (2010) use structural dynamic
factor models and show that delayed overshooting disappears once a su¢ cient amount of economic information is
included in the model.
13explosive draws. With the posterior draws for ~ Ad
it;k and ~ ￿d; we can then compute the reduced
form parameters Ad
it;k and ￿d
it; using the expressions of section 3.2. Since matrix ~ Ait;k can vary
with mortgage market characteristics, this implies that the covariance matrix ￿it = ~ Ait;k~ ￿ ~ A
0
it;k also
depends on mortgage market characteristics, whereas starting from the reduced form speci￿cation
implies a constant covariance matrix.12
For a given parameter draw, we then account for identi￿cation uncertainty and compute the
set of B matrices that satis￿es the sign restrictions. Let ~ Bd be an orthogonal factorization, e.g.
the Choleski decomposition, of the posterior draw of the covariance matrix ￿d; with ~ Bd ~ B0
d = ￿d:
Multiplying ~ Bd with orthonormal matrix Q , Bd = ~ BdQ; will generate another decomposition of
￿d : BdB0
d = ~ BdQ Q0 ~ B0
d: Following Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and Zha (2009) we compute Q
by drawing an independent standard normal q ￿ q matrix X and apply the QR decomposition
X = QR: We keep the draw if Bd generates impulse responses that satisfy the sign restrictions for
both shocks. For a given parameter draw, we repeatedly draw Q until we have found 100 matrices
that satisfy the sign restrictions. We save the point wise median and 16th and 84th percentiles of
the impulse response distribution generated by accepted matrices Bd:
We repeat this exercise for 100 parameter draws and save median, upper, and lower percentile
for each parameter draw. This gives us 100 di⁄erent estimates of the median, the lower, and the
upper percentile. The ￿rst statistic focuses on the distribution of all medians. We report the
median of all medians and, as error bands, the 16th and 84th percentile of the distribution. In
this case the error bands account for parameter uncertainty and re￿ ect the uncertainty about the
true median that comes from limited sample size. As a second statistic we report the median of
the lower and upper percentile across all parameter draws. In this case the error bands re￿ ect
identi￿cation uncertainty.
In comparison to our approach, error bands reported in Uhlig (2005) re￿ ect both parameter
and identi￿cation uncertainty. Separating identi￿cation and parameter uncertainty can provide
useful additional information. The type of uncertainty that should be taken under consideration in
constructing error bands depends on the question being asked. If the question is whether we can
con￿dently say that the response of house prices to a capital in￿ ows shocks is positive, we should
account for both parameter and identi￿cation uncertainty. We have to consider both the fact that we
have only a limited amount of data (which leads to parameter uncertainty) and limited information
on the properties of the structural shocks (which leads to identi￿cation uncertainty). But if the
question is whether impulse responses di⁄er between countries with high and low mortgage market
development, we should focus on parameter uncertainty. This is because structural mortgage market
12In principle, the posterior of reduced form Ait;k and ￿it will depend on the ordering of the variables in the
recursive VAR. Our speci￿cation orders world output and prices ￿rst, followed by domestic variables ordered as in
the data section. A related issue arises in a stochastically time-varying structural VAR as discussed in Primiceri
(2005). Primiceri notes that the problem could be resolved by estimating the model with several orderings. We have
experimented with this and our results were not quantitatively sensitive to the ordering. Even a model that starts
from the reduced form speci￿cation and keeps the covariance matrix of the forecast error constant gave very similar
results. Identi￿cation based on sign restrictions that cover multiple horizons is also less sensitive to the estimate of
the covariance matrix than identi￿cation based on short run restrictions, since the set of accepted impulse responses
also depends on the autoregressive coe¢ cients.
14di⁄erences between the two types of countries will be re￿ ected in di⁄erences in parameters rather
than identi￿cation. We are interested whether the distribution of accepted impulse responses shifts
and a central parameter of the distribution is its median. The con￿dence with which we can say
that the distribution of medians di⁄ers between the two types of countries depends on how precise
the estimates are, which relates to parameter uncertainty. When comparing medians for two types
of countries, we account for potential correlation between the median estimates and compute the
medians with the same parameter draws.13
To ensure comparability of impulse responses, we normalize the size of the shocks to one stan-
dard deviation based on the corresponding covariance matrix of forecast errors. Normalizing with
respect to the size of the shock seems preferable to normalizing with respect to the response of
a given variable. While for monetary policy shocks normalizing with respect to the short term
interest rate may seem natural ￿ for example, a fall by 25 basis points ￿ it is not obvious what
variable should be normalized for a capital in￿ ows shock. Normalizing the size of a shock to one
standard deviation is equivalent to normalizing with respect to the probability of the event, since
under normality a one standard deviation shock implies that events are smaller in absolute size in
68% of the cases. This facilitates the comparison of capital in￿ ows and monetary policy shocks and
the comparison across di⁄erent mortgage market structures.
Note that, since our estimate of the covariance matrix varies with mortgage market character-
istics, if we observe a larger increase in house prices in countries with more developed mortgage
markets we cannot conclude that the structure of the mortgage market is amplifying the shocks. It
may simply be the case that the one standard deviation normalization produces shocks of a larger
magnitude for the group of countries with more developed mortgage markets. We therefore report
also the responses of non-housing variables across groups of countries with di⁄erent mortgage mar-
ket structures. If the response of non-housing variables is broadly the same, we consider it more
likely that we are comparing shocks of similar sizes and that di⁄erences in the response of housing
variables stem from an ampli￿cation e⁄ect.
4 Results
4.1 The E⁄ects of Capital In￿ ows and Monetary Policy Shocks on Housing
Variables
Figures 3 and 4 show the impulse response functions over 40 quarters for a one standard deviation
capital in￿ ows and monetary policy shock. We plot the median (solid blue line) and the 16th
and 84th percentiles that account for parameter uncertainty (dashed red lines) and identi￿cation
13Uhlig (2005) proposes as an alternative to the pure sign restriction approach where error bands only re￿ ect
parameter uncertainty. The approach chooses the orthogonal factorization that minimizes a penalty function that
penalizes wrong sign and rewards correct signs of impulse responses. To identify a unique decomposition the penalty
function rewards strong responses with the correct sign more than weak responses with the correct sign. A disad-
vantage is that we lose the information about identi￿cation uncertainty and the choice of the penalty function is
arbitrary. The reward of strong responses also tends to make the selected responses larger than the median.
15uncertainty (dotted black lines). The grey shaded area indicates the variables and the horizon for
which sign restrictions are imposed.
At the median a capital in￿ ows shock leads on impact to a current account de￿cit of about 0:2%
of GDP, the long rate falls by about 11 basis points and the real e⁄ective exchange rate appreciates
by about 0:8%. Consumption peaks at 0:2% after six quarters and non-residential rises quickly
by about 0:8%. The responses of world output and world prices are of very small magnitude, in
line with the relatively small size of an average OECD country. We do not discuss the response of
world variables in detail, but consider them as pure controls for external events.
A capital in￿ ows shock leads to an expansion of the housing sector. There is a persistent rise in
real private credit and house prices that in both cases peak after seven quarters at about 0:5% and
0:6%, before slowly reverting back to zero. The response of residential investment is quicker and
more short-lived, peaking at 0:7% after two quarters. Error bands indicate that the responses for
all housing sector variables are statistically signi￿cant. The price level initially falls by about 0:05%
before beginning to rise after about a year. The de￿ ationary pressures may arise either because a
nominal appreciation lowers the domestic currency prices of imports or as a result of an in￿ ow of
cheap imports. The nominal short rate falls by about the same amount as the long rate (10 basis
points), keeping the term spread initially constant. The short rate then starts to rise and peaks at
8 basis points after ten quarters. The shape of the response is consistent with a central bank that
reacts to the fall in prices by lowering policy interest rates and then starts raising them again as
in￿ ation resumes. If we assume that central banks do not have full control over the short rate, an
alternative explanation is that capital in￿ ows a⁄ect the term structure at all maturities by about
the same amount.
A monetary policy shock leads to a fall in the short rate by 25 basis points. The long rate falls
by only 10 basis points and the term spread therefore rises. We observe a permanent increase in the
price level of about 0:1%. Consumption rises to about 0:2% above trend after six quarters and falls
slowly back to its long term value. The hump shaped response of consumption and its timing are
consistent with previous studies that document the e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks in VARs.14
Non-residential investment increases on impact by about 0:6% and reverts back afterwards. The real
exchange rate depreciates initially by about 0:4% and then appreciates slowly back to its long run
value with a slight delay in overshooting, which is broadly consistent with Dornbusch￿ s overshooting
model. The current account does not move, possibly because the gain in competitiveness from an
exchange rate depreciation is compensated by stronger demand for imports. The shape of the
response of housing variables to the monetary policy shock is similar to the capital in￿ ows shock,
but the size of the response is smaller. Real credit and house prices peak at about 0:3% after
ten quarters. Real residential investment peaks at 0:2%. For all three housing variables, zero lies
outside the identi￿cation uncertainty error bands at some point, but at short horizons the bands
are wide.
Table 4 shows the forecast error variance decomposition. At the median, capital in￿ ows shocks
14See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) for a survey.
16explain up to 14% of the variance in real credit and 12% of the variance in house prices and
residential investment at longer forecast horizons. By contrast, monetary policy shocks explain
only up to 8% of the variance of real credit, 6% of the variance in house prices and 5% of the
variance in residential investment. These results are consistent with SÆ and Wieladek (2010) who
￿nd that, for the United States, capital in￿ ows shocks explain a substantially larger fraction of the
variance in house prices than monetary policy shocks.
4.2 The Role of Cross-Sectional Variation in Mortgage Market Development
We use the index of mortgage market development in IMF (2008) to split countries into two
groups: a group with more developed mortgage markets and a group with less developed mortgage
markets. Figures 5 and 6 compare median impulse responses of housing variables for the two groups
and Figures 7 and 8 compare responses of non housing variables. Error bands re￿ ect parameter
uncertainty.
Mortgage market development a⁄ects the transmission of monetary policy shocks: in a highly
developed mortgage market the rise in real residential investment peaks at about 0:5%, compared
to a zero response in a low developed market. Real house prices increase by more than 0:4% after
ten quarters in a more developed market, compared to a very muted response in a less developed
market. The peak response of real private credit in a highly developed market at 0:4% is about
double the response in a less developed market. These di⁄erences are statistically signi￿cant for all
three variables, but only marginally so for private credit.
The di⁄erences in the responses to monetary policy shocks across the two groups of countries
are concentrated on housing variables, supporting the view that the IMF index captures housing-
speci￿c heterogeneity. There are no signi￿cant di⁄erences on impact in the responses of consumption
and non-residential investment, but in countries with a liberalized mortgage market the responses
are somewhat more persistent (Figure 8). The increased persistence may arise because of second-
round e⁄ects from an increase in housing activity. We also do not ￿nd substantial di⁄erences in the
responses of other non-housing variables, such as interest rates or the real exchange rate, suggesting
that the stronger e⁄ect in a liberalized market stems from ampli￿cation in the transmission of the
shock rather than from a larger shock.
Capital in￿ ows shocks also have a greater e⁄ect on housing variables in countries with higher
mortgage market development (Figure 5). The responses of real house prices and residential in-
vestment are clearly stronger and the di⁄erences are statistically signi￿cant. The response of real
private credit has a similar magnitude in both groups of countries, but is more persistent in coun-
tries with more developed mortgage markets. Regarding the responses of non-housing variables
(Figure 7), we observe a stronger response of consumption in countries with more developed mort-
gage markets, possibly because of a wealth e⁄ect through higher house prices. As for monetary
policy shocks, the response of non-residential investment is more persistent in countries with more
developed mortgage markets, but there are no di⁄erences at short horizons. There are also no
notable di⁄erences in the responses of other non-housing variables.
17Table 4 shows that the share of the forecast error variance of the three housing variables that
can be explained by monetary and capital in￿ ows shocks tends to be slightly higher in the group
of countries with a more developed mortgage market.
Our results indicate that capital ￿ ows and monetary policy shocks have a stronger e⁄ect on
housing variables in more developed mortgage markets and are consistent with a role for the ￿nancial
accelerator. In highly developed mortgage markets households can pledge a larger fraction of their
house as collateral, which results in higher leverage. If households are highly indebted, they are
more sensitive to changes in interest rates because small changes in rates can have a large e⁄ect on
their ability to service the debt. As a result, housing demand becomes more sensitive to interest
rates.
4.3 The Role of Securitization and Time-varying Financial Structure
Figures 9 and 10 compare the impulse responses of housing variables in countries with a high
and a low prevalence of mortgage-backed securities. We evaluate the reduced form coe¢ cients at
values MBSHIGH = 0:75 and MBSLOW = 0:25, on a scale from 0 to 1 and report the median
impulse response with error bands that account for parameter uncertainty. A high value of the
index indicates that mortgage-backed securitization is permitted, while a low value indicates that
securitization is restricted.
Capital in￿ ows shocks have a larger and more persistent e⁄ect in countries that allow for
mortgage-backed securities. In a country with a high MBS index the response of real private
credit peaks at 0:8%, which is approximately two times stronger than in a country with a low MBS
index. A high value of the MBS index also ampli￿es the responses of real residential investment
and house prices by a factor of about 2. The di⁄erences are statistically signi￿cant for all three
variables.
The amplifying e⁄ect of mortgage-backed securities on housing variables is also re￿ ected in
the forecast error variance decomposition, reported in Table 4. Capital in￿ ows shocks explain
about 17% of the variation in real credit at the ten year horizon in countries with high levels of
securitization, compared to about 11% in countries with low levels of securitization. For real house
prices, the fraction is 17% in high securitization countries versus 10% in low securitization countries.
For real residential investment the fraction is 17% versus 9%.
Securitization also ampli￿es monetary policy shocks, but to a smaller degree. In countries with
a high MBS index the e⁄ect of monetary policy shocks on real residential investment peaks at
0:4% compared with 0:2% in countries with a low MBS index. The peak responses of house prices
is about 0:1% higher in countries where mortgage-backed securitization is more prevalent. Both
di⁄erences are statistically signi￿cant, but only for a short horizon. There is no notable di⁄erence
in the response of credit.
In terms of forecast error variance decompositions, reported in Table 4, there is no evidence
that the contribution of monetary policy shocks is larger in countries that have mortgage-backed
securities. The fraction of the variance in the housing variables explained by monetary policy shocks
18is even somewhat smaller in countries with high prevalence of MBS. In countries with high levels of
securitization monetary policy shocks explain between 4% and 5% of the variation in credit, house
prices and residential investment at long horizons. This compares with fractions between 6% and
9% in countries with low levels of securitization.
The ￿nding that securitization ampli￿es the e⁄ects of both shocks is again consistent with
the presence of a ￿nancial accelerator mechanism. If we assume that securitization increases the
e¢ ciency of the ￿nancial system and allows households to be more leveraged, the e⁄ect of interest
rate changes on the housing market should increase. The results are also consistent with the
argument in Rajan (2005) that securitization allowed banks to take more risk and made them more
sensitive to changes in interest rates. It does not automatically follow from these explanations
that the ampli￿cation e⁄ect of securitization should be stronger for capital in￿ ows shocks than
for monetary policy shocks. One reason for this, suggested by Diamond and Rajan (2009), is
that securitization allows international investors to invest directly in mortgage debt. Securitization
packages mortgages together and slices them in di⁄erent levels of risk. The riskiest tranches can be
bought by investors with higher risk appetite, while the AAA tranches can be sold to international
investors who look for safe assets. In this way, securitization increases the share of foreign capital
in￿ ows allocated to home mortgage loans, amplifying the e⁄ects of capital in￿ ows on the domestic
housing market.
Figures 11 and 12 report the di⁄erences in the responses of non-housing variables. The response
of consumption to a capital in￿ ows shock is about 0:15% stronger in countries with high levels of
securitization, again consistent with a wealth e⁄ect through higher house prices. The rise in non-
residential investment is somewhat smaller on impact in securitized countries, but is more persistent.
There are also some di⁄erences in the response of the other variables. For example, the reaction of
the current account and the long term interest rate is stronger and more persistent in securitized
countries. This may indicate that part of the stronger response of housing variables comes from a
change in the response of these other variables. For monetary policy shocks, however, the responses
of non-housing variables is similar in countries with high and low securitization.
5 Robustness
5.1 Changes in the Sample Period
A major limitation of the index of mortgage market development constructed in IMF (2008) is that
it does not vary over time. In Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries deregulation of mortgage markets
was relatively rapid and largely completed by the mid-1980s. Because our sample starts in 1984, it
would capture the period post-deregulation in these countries. However, in Japan and continental
Europe the process was more gradual.
To check whether our results are a⁄ected by structural changes in the degree of mortgage market
regulation, we estimate the model restricting sample to the period from 1990Q1 to 2006Q4. Table 5
19reports the responses in countries with high and low mortgage market development at the one-year
and three-years horizons, together with 16th and 84th percentiles. For comparison, the baseline
results for the period from 1984Q1 to 2006Q4 are also reported.
The results for the restricted time period are qualitatively similar but less precise than the
baseline results. The reduction in precision is probably due to a smaller number of observations.
As before, the responses of the housing variables to both shocks tend to be stronger in countries
with a high degree of mortgage market development.
5.2 Alternative Sample-splitting Criteria
For further robustness, we also report results for three alternative sample splitting criteria: the ratio
of mortgage debt to GDP listed in Calza et al. (2009), the possibility of mortgage equity withdrawal,
and the typical loan-to-value ratio. Again, only time-invariant (cross-sectional) information is
available for these measures.
The results, reported in Table 6 suggest that housing variables respond more strongly to both
shocks in countries that have a higher mortgage to GDP ratio. In all cases the di⁄erences have the
expected sign and are statistically signi￿cant at least at one of the horizons in ￿ve out of six cases.
In countries that allow for mortgage equity withdrawal all three housing variables respond more
strongly to monetary policy and capital in￿ ows shocks. Except for the response of private credit
to a capital in￿ ows shock, the di⁄erence is signi￿cant at one-year or three-years horizons. When
we split the sample according to typical loan-to-value ratio, the di⁄erences have again the expected
sign, but tend to be insigni￿cant.
5.3 Monetary Unions and Exchange Rate Regimes
The introduction of the Euro in 1999 and the loss of monetary policy independence by its adopters
creates two potential problems for our methodology. The ￿rst problem concerns the correct iden-
ti￿cation of the shocks: part of the identi￿ed unexpected movements in interest rates may be
forecastable if one accounts for Euro Area fundamentals and are only surprising from a single
country￿ s perspective. The second problem concerns the transmission of the shocks, which may
be a⁄ected by changes in exchange rate regimes (for example, moving from a ￿ oating to a ￿xed
exchange rate).
One way to adapt our framework to take into account the adoption of the Euro would be to
look at a Euro Area aggregate rather than at individual member countries. We see some important
drawbacks with that approach. First, before 1999 member countries had autonomy in the conduct
of monetary policy and aggregation would neglect this fact. Second, our analysis has revealed
important heterogeneity in the transmission of shocks to the housing sector and aggregation would
eliminate this heterogeneity.
Because of these drawbacks with aggregation, we follow previous studies that investigate the
transmission of monetary policy shocks ￿ Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2010), Calza et al.
(2009) and Goodhart and Ho⁄mann (2008) ￿ and treat each country as a separate cross-sectional
20unit. In contrast to these studies, however, our model controls for movements in output and prices in
the country￿ s trading partners, often other Euro members. This should help with the identi￿cation
of monetary policy shocks. In addition, we identify monetary policy shocks using sign restrictions,
an approach that is less vulnerable to omitted variable bias than a recursive scheme, since it pins
down the sign of the responses of important macroeconomic variables.
To address the second problem ￿ the possibility that the adoption of the Euro may have
a⁄ected the transmission of shocks ￿ we augment the model by including an exchange rate regime
variable as an additional interaction term. The exchange rate regime is captured by an indicator
variable that takes a value of one for a peg and zero otherwise and is constructed using the IMF￿ s
de jure classi￿cation.
Table 7 reports the impulse responses evaluated at a value zero for the indicator variable, i.e.,
for countries without a peg.15 Our main results hold both for the IMF index of mortgage market
development and for the securitization index. This suggests that our main conclusions still hold in
countries without a peg when we control for the exchange rate regime.
6 Conclusion
In this study we examine three di⁄erent explanations for housing sector booms: monetary policy,
capital in￿ ows and ￿nancial innovation. We estimate a panel VAR model and identify monetary
policy and capital in￿ ows shocks using sign restrictions. To assess whether the structure of the
mortgage market a⁄ects the transmission of macroeconomic shocks to the housing sector we split
the sample into countries with high and low mortgage market development. We also adapt the
model to allow the coe¢ cients in the VAR to vary with the degree of securitization.
We ￿nd that both capital in￿ ows and monetary policy shocks have a signi￿cant and positive
e⁄ect on real house prices, real credit to the private sector and real residential investment. Housing
variables respond more strongly to both shocks in countries with a more developed mortgage market
and in countries where securitization is more prevalent. This is consistent with the presence of a
￿nancial accelerator mechanism. In highly developed mortgage markets households can pledge
a larger fraction of their house as collateral, which results in higher leverage. If households are
highly indebted, they are more sensitive to changes in the value of collateral. We ￿nd that the
propagation e⁄ect of securitization is stronger for capital in￿ ows than for monetary policy shocks.
The response of housing variables to capital in￿ ows shocks is larger and longer lasting in countries
where securitization is allowed. A potential explanation is that mortgage-backed securitization
transforms illiquid, low-grade loans into publicly traded assets of higher quality which are attractive
to international investors. In this way, securitization increases the share of foreign capital in￿ ows
allocated to home mortgage loans, amplifying the e⁄ects of capital in￿ ows on the domestic housing
market.
15Impulse responses for countries with a peg were imprecise, although not in contradiction with our results. These
responses are available on request.
21The run-up to the present crisis was characterized by a housing boom in most OECD countries.
Our results suggest that capital in￿ ows coupled with innovations in the mortgage market played
an important role in the housing boom. This implies that countries with more developed mortgage
markets and a high degree of securitization should be wary of large external imbalances and work
towards their reduction. At the same time, improved ￿nancial regulation would help reduce the
e⁄ect of capital in￿ ows on asset prices.
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26Figure 1. House prices and the current account 
 
Notes: Data are averages over the period 1999 Q1 to 2006 Q4. Current account/GDP is from the OECD Economic Outlook. Real house 
price index is from the BIS Property Price Statistics. 
Figure 2. Index of mortgage market development – IMF (2008) 
 
 
 Figure 3. Impulse responses to capital inflows shock 
 
Notes: The size of the shocks is normalized to one standard deviation. The median is represented by the solid blue line. The 16th and 
84th percentiles are represented by dashed red lines  when  accounting for parameter uncertainty and by dotted black lines when 






 Figure 4. Impulse responses to monetary policy shock 
 
Notes: The size of the shocks is normalized to one standard deviation. The median is represented by the solid blue line. The 16th and 
84th percentiles are represented by dashed red lines  when  accounting for parameter uncertainty and by dotted black lines when 








 Figure 5. The role of mortgage market development: response of housing variables to capital inflows shock 
 
Notes: The size of the shocks is normalized to one standard deviation. The median is represented by the solid blue line. The 16th and 
84th percentiles that account for parameter uncertainty are represented by dashed red lines. 
Figure 6. The role of mortgage market development: response of housing variables to monetary policy shock 
 
Notes: The size of the shocks is normalized to one standard deviation. The median is represented by the solid blue line. The 16th and 
84th percentiles that account for parameter uncertainty are represented by dashed red lines. Figure 7. The role of mortgage market development: response of non-housing variables to capital inflows 
shock 
 
Notes: The size of the shocks is normalized to one standard deviation. The median is represented by the solid blue line. The 16th and 








 Figure 8. The role of mortgage market development: response of non-housing variables to monetary policy 
shock 
 
Notes: The size of the shocks is normalized to one standard deviation. The median is represented by the solid blue line. The 16th and 








 Figure 9. The role of securitization: response of housing variables to capital inflows shock 
 
Notes: The size of the shocks is normalized to one standard deviation. The median is represented by the solid blue line. The 16th and 
84th percentiles that account for parameter uncertainty are represented by dashed red lines. 
Figure 10. The role of securitization: response of housing variables to monetary policy shock 
 
Notes: The size of the shocks is normalized to one standard deviation. The median is represented by the solid blue line. The 16th and 
84th percentiles that account for parameter uncertainty are represented by dashed red lines. Figure 11. The role of securitization: response of non-housing variables to capital inflows shock 
 
Notes: The size of the shocks is normalized to one standard deviation. The median is represented by the solid blue line. The 16th and 








 Figure 12. The role of securitization: response of non-housing variables to monetary policy shock 
 
Notes: The size of the shocks is normalized to one standard deviation. The median is represented by the solid blue line. The 16th and 












a seasonally adjusted; 
b As in Goodhart and Hoffman (2008) we adjust for level shifts that occur because of redefinitions or 
reclassifications by replacing the growth rate in the quarter where the shift occurs with median growth of the two quarters before and 
after the shift. Level shifts occur for the following countries at the following dates: AUS 1984Q3, 1984Q4, 1988Q4; BEL 1992Q4; CAN 
1981Q1, 2001Q4; CHE 1974Q4, 1982Q3; DEU 1990Q2, 1999Q1; DNK 1991Q1, 2000Q3; FRA 1978Q1; ITA 1991Q1, 1999Q1; IRE 




Table 2. Mortgage market development: sample splits 
 
 



















 Table 5. Mortgage market development: results for different sample periods 
High Low Difference
4q 12q 4q 12q 4q 12q
IMF Index
Monetary Policy Shock
prcred. 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.19 0.01 0.16
(0.06, 0.26) (0.29, 0.50) (0.05, 0.28) (0.08, 0.33) (-0.15, 0.14) (0.03, 0.36)
house pr. 0.34 0.44 0.01 0.19 0.33 0.20
(0.22, 0.47) (0.30, 0.55) (-0.14, 0.13) (0.07, 0.33) (0.19, 0.53) (0.06, 0.41)
res. inv. 0.42 0.33 -0.05 0.13 0.47 0.18
(0.25, 0.56) (0.19, 0.47) (-0.26, 0.18) (0.03, 0.23) (0.21, 0.69) (-0.02, 0.41)
CapitalInflows Shock
prcred. 0.38 0.54 0.45 0.34 -0.06 0.22
(0.28, 0.49) (0.41, 0.73) (0.36, 0.56) (0.21, 0.48) (-0.21, 0.06) (0.02, 0.43)
house pr. 0.50 0.67 0.45 0.31 0.06 0.33
(0.40, 0.62) (0.50, 0.89) (0.28, 0.56) (0.21, 0.46) (-0.10, 0.23) (0.15, 0.60)
res. inv. 0.79 0.62 0.44 0.18 0.33 0.42
(0.58, 0.97) (0.41, 0.86) (0.28, 0.65) (0.06, 0.34) (0.07, 0.51) (0.18, 0.74)
IMF Index (since 1990)
Monetary Policy Shock
prcred. 0.07 0.20 0.16 0.20 -0.10 0.01
(-0.07, 0.21) (0.13, 0.30) (0.06, 0.27) (0.10, 0.30) (-0.29, 0.09) (-0.14, 0.15)
house pr. 0.36 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.32 0.03
(0.22, 0.50) (0.01, 0.28) (-0.09, 0.17) (-0.00, 0.16) (0.16, 0.52) (-0.10, 0.22)
res. inv. 0.50 0.00 0.13 0.10 0.38 -0.13
(0.29, 0.72) (-0.15, 0.15) (-0.04, 0.30) (-0.01, 0.22) (0.11, 0.67) (-0.29, 0.09)
CapitalInflows Shock
prcred. 0.30 0.23 0.27 0.22 0.01 0.01
(0.20, 0.41) (0.11, 0.36) (0.17, 0.36) (0.13, 0.35) (-0.11, 0.22) (-0.16, 0.19)
house pr. 0.46 0.45 0.33 0.17 0.15 0.29
(0.30, 0.63) (0.27, 0.80) (0.19, 0.43) (0.09, 0.27) (-0.06, 0.35) (0.04, 0.60)
res. inv. 0.48 0.27 0.40 0.15 0.10 0.10
(0.25, 0.69) (0.08, 0.55) (0.16, 0.64) (0.06, 0.33) (-0.22, 0.31) (-0.13, 0.41)
 
Notes: Table reports the median of medians of the impulse responses. Values in brackets are the 16
th and 84
th percentiles of the 
distribution of medians and account for parameter uncertainty. 
 Table 6. Mortgage market development: results for different sample-splitting criteria 
Hig h Lo w Differen ce
4 q 12 q 4 q 12 q 4 q 12 q
M o rtg a g e Deb t
M o n etary Po licy Sh o ck
p r cred . 0.18 0.36 0.11 0.29 0.04 0.07
(0.06, 0.27) (0.25, 0.43) (0.03, 0.21) (0.15, 0.41) (-0.12, 0.20) (-0.09, 0.23)
h o u s e p r. 0.30 0.45 -0.00 0.25 0.29 0.18
(0.18, 0.45) (0.31, 0.58) (-0.11, 0.15) (0.15, 0.38) (0.13, 0.47) (0.01, 0.38)
res . in v . 0.31 0.28 -0.09 0.17 0.40 0.10
(0.19, 0.48) (0.18, 0.48) (-0.24, 0.07) (0.05, 0.30) (0.18, 0.66) (-0.05, 0.36)
Cap ital In flo ws Sh o ck
p r cred . 0.50 0.58 0.44 0.36 0.07 0.23
(0.43, 0.58) (0.44, 0.75) (0.34, 0.54) (0.21, 0.48) (-0.04, 0.20) (0.02, 0.46)
h o u s e p r. 0.58 0.78 0.50 0.26 0.07 0.52
(0.44, 0.68) (0.63, 1.00) (0.37, 0.64) (0.15, 0.42) (-0.12, 0.26) (0.32, 0.78)
res . in v . 0.78 0.60 0.57 0.22 0.22 0.38
(0.65, 0.90) (0.43, 0.90) (0.35, 0.76) (0.09, 0.39) (0.02, 0.40) (0.17, 0.66)
M E W
M o n etary Po licy Sh o ck
p r cred . 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.21 0.00 0.13
(0.09, 0.24) (0.24, 0.43) (0.06, 0.26) (0.07, 0.32) (-0.13, 0.14) (0.00, 0.30)
h o u s e p r. 0.37 0.47 0.01 0.16 0.37 0.30
(0.25, 0.48) (0.33, 0.60) (-0.14, 0.12) (0.02, 0.30) (0.22, 0.53) (0.13, 0.46)
res . in v . 0.32 0.34 -0.08 0.10 0.39 0.26
(0.19, 0.42) (0.20, 0.47) (-0.28, 0.14) (-0.02, 0.21) (0.12, 0.62) (0.09, 0.42)
Cap ital In flo ws Sh o ck
p r cred . 0.43 0.47 0.46 0.38 -0.03 0.10
(0.36, 0.52) (0.37, 0.60) (0.37, 0.57) (0.26, 0.54) (-0.16, 0.09) (-0.08, 0.27)
h o u s e p r. 0.56 0.69 0.49 0.39 0.06 0.30
(0.47, 0.66) (0.55, 0.92) (0.38, 0.62) (0.24, 0.55) (-0.11, 0.21) (0.11, 0.55)
res . in v . 0.66 0.58 0.74 0.24 -0.08 0.34
(0.51, 0.79) (0.44, 0.75) (0.52, 0.92) (0.09, 0.41) (-0.33, 0.17) (0.14, 0.57)
Lo a n To V a lu e
M o n etary Po licy Sh o ck
p r cred . 0.12 0.35 0.17 0.28 -0.05 0.06
(0.02, 0.24) (0.23, 0.47) (0.10, 0.24) (0.20, 0.35) (-0.19, 0.10) (-0.04, 0.20)
h o u s e p r. 0.21 0.34 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.07
(0.09, 0.33) (0.20, 0.49) (-0.04, 0.20) (0.19, 0.41) (-0.05, 0.27) (-0.13, 0.25)
res . in v . 0.25 0.22 0.12 0.22 0.12 -0.01
(0.06, 0.43) (0.08, 0.36) (-0.05, 0.26) (0.15, 0.30) (-0.13, 0.37) (-0.16, 0.16)
Cap ital In flo ws Sh o ck
p r cred . 0.42 0.51 0.50 0.36 -0.06 0.16
(0.34, 0.53) (0.38, 0.71) (0.42, 0.59) (0.26, 0.46) (-0.20, 0.04) (-0.03, 0.39)
h o u s e p r. 0.38 0.59 0.51 0.40 -0.13 0.22
(0.28, 0.48) (0.47, 0.84) (0.34, 0.63) (0.26, 0.51) (-0.33, 0.08) (0.05, 0.48)
res . in v . 0.63 0.44 0.57 0.28 0.05 0.15
(0.39, 0.79) (0.29, 0.68) (0.43, 0.74) (0.14, 0.37) (-0.25, 0.26) (-0.04, 0.50)
 
Notes: Table reports the median of medians of the impulse responses. Values in brackets are the 16
th and 84
th percentiles of the 
distribution of medians and account for parameter uncertainty. Table 7. Results controlling for exchange rate regime 
High Low Difference
4 q 12 q 4 q 12 q 4 q 12 q
IMF Index
Monetary Policy Shock
pr cred. 0.21 0.40 0.24 0.29 -0.03 0.11
(0.10, 0.31) (0.32, 0.50) (0.10, 0.35) (0.17, 0.42) (-0.19, 0.16) (-0.04, 0.26)
house pr. 0.22 0.41 -0.04 0.18 0.29 0.24
(0.12, 0.36) (0.31, 0.51) (-0.20, 0.10) (0.07, 0.32) (0.07, 0.50) (0.05, 0.37)
res. inv. 0.37 0.36 0.02 0.16 0.35 0.22
(0.20, 0.55) (0.24, 0.52) (-0.18, 0.26) (0.06, 0.31) (0.04, 0.61) (0.03, 0.37)
Capital Inflows Shock
pr cred. 0.36 0.45 0.43 0.42 -0.07 0.02
(0.26, 0.47) (0.33, 0.57) (0.33, 0.55) (0.31, 0.59) (-0.23, 0.08) (-0.15, 0.18)
house pr. 0.46 0.56 0.41 0.39 0.06 0.17
(0.37, 0.58) (0.42, 0.78) (0.26, 0.58) (0.26, 0.57) (-0.13, 0.22) (-0.02, 0.41)
res. inv. 0.70 0.54 0.31 0.37 0.36 0.14
(0.47, 0.82) (0.34, 0.76) (0.12, 0.53) (0.23, 0.49) (0.05, 0.65) (-0.03, 0.42)
MBS Index
Monetary Policy Shock
pr cred. -0.09 0.21 0.18 0.32 -0.26 -0.11
(-0.26, 0.08) (0.09, 0.35) (0.09, 0.26) (0.26, 0.41) (-0.43, -0.11) (-0.26, 0.03)
house pr. 0.36 0.13 0.01 0.28 0.38 -0.17
(0.11, 0.60) (-0.10, 0.39) (-0.09, 0.09) (0.20, 0.34) (0.07, 0.56) (-0.35, 0.12)
res. inv. 0.53 -0.10 0.09 0.26 0.39 -0.37
(0.14, 0.79) (-0.32, 0.13) (-0.06, 0.25) (0.18, 0.33) (0.10, 0.71) (-0.64, -0.08)
Capital Inflows Shock
pr cred. 0.47 0.62 0.37 0.28 0.13 0.34
(0.32, 0.64) (0.34, 0.85) (0.28, 0.46) (0.18, 0.38) (-0.04, 0.28) (0.09, 0.57)
house pr. 0.44 0.88 0.46 0.30 -0.01 0.55
(0.28, 0.65) (0.44, 1.20) (0.38, 0.57) (0.20, 0.43) (-0.21, 0.19) (0.17, 0.91)
res. inv. 0.88 0.74 0.51 0.27 0.38 0.46
(0.56, 1.25) (0.34, 1.23) (0.35, 0.67) (0.17, 0.39) (0.08, 0.72) (0.10, 0.90)
 
Notes: Table reports the results for a model which includes an interaction with an indicator equal to 1 if the exchange rate is fixed and 0 
otherwise. The results in the table are obtained evaluating the model for countries without a peg (i.e. when the indicator takes the value 
0). We report the median of medians of the impulse responses and in brackets are the 16
th and 84
th percentiles of the distribution of 
medians accounting for parameter uncertainty. 